

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7671

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 3 ADDIS ABABA 0334

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR OAU AO US

SUBJ: CODEL DIGGS: CONGR. DIGGS JAN 11 PRESS STATEMENTS

THERE FOLLOWS VERBATIM TEXT OF STATEMENTS RELEASED BY CONG.
CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., AT WELL-ATTENDED PRESS CONFERENCE
IN ADDIS ABABA JAN 11, 1976:

BEGIN TEXT

PRESS STATEMENT ON ANGOLA BY CONGRESSMAN CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR.
ADDIS ABABA, JANUARY 11, 1976

AMERICAN INTRUSION IN THE ANGOLA CONFLICT IS THE
BIGGEST BLUNDER IN THE HISTORY OF ITS RELATIONS WITH
AFRICA AND MAY BE THE MOST SERIOUS FOREIGN POLICY
MISCALCULATION IT HAS EVER MADE.

WERE IT NOT FOR THE AWESOME REVERENCE ACCORDED TO SECRETARY
OF STATE KISSINGER, THIS ANGOLA MISADVENTURE MAY HAVE
FORCED HIS RESIGNATION. REGRETTABLY PRESIDENT FORD
HAS BLINDLY FOLLOWED KISSINGER'S FOLLY.

THE ERROR OF ALLOWING U.S. POLICY TO CONVERGE WITH
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THAT OF WHITE SUPREMACIST SOUTH AFRICA WAS COMPOUNDED

BY THE COVERT NATURE OF THE OPERATION, AND FURTHER EXACERBATED BY THE REVELATION THAT THE U.S. HAS NO VITAL INTERESTS IN ANGOLA. DID THE US INTERVENE TO HOLD BACK THE EXPANSION OF PROGRESSIVE AFRICAN MAJORITY RULED STATES SOUTHWARD TOWARD THE CAPE UNDER THE GUISE OF MEETING A SOVIET CHALLENGE?

WASHINGTON OFFICIALS REFUSE TO ADJUST TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALITIES OF THE SEVENTIES. DESPITE THE COUP IN PORTUGAL, THE INDEPENDENCE OF MOZAMBIQUE, GUINEA BISSAU, CAPE VERDE AND SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE, THE BRITISH UNILATERAL ABROGATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SIMONSTOWN AGREEMENT, THE FRENCH REASSESSMENT OF ITS MILITARY SALES POLICY WITH SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE INEVITABLE DECLINE OF THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE CAPE ROUTE WITH THE REOPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL, THE ADMINISTRATION APPARENTLY STILL BASES ITS SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLICY ON THE REACTIONARY SUPPORT, DESPITE PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS, FOR RACIST MINORITY RULE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND RHODESIA.

THE TRAGEDY OF US ANGOLAN POLICY IS THAT THIS FIASCO WAS NOT INEVITABLE. APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS WERE COMING FROM U.S. EMBASSIES IN THE FIELD AND FROM WITHIN THE AFRICAN BUREAU OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT, BUT ONCE AGAIN AFRICAN SPECIALISTS WERE CIRCUMVENTED BY THE SECRETARY'S IMPERIOUS ATTITUDE AND PROCLIVITY TOWARD VIEWING CONFLICTS IN TERMS OF EXERCISES IN EAST-WEST ONE UPSMANSHIP. IF BRAZIL, A MILITARY POWER KNOWN FOR ITS CONSERVATIVE POLICES LOCATED LESS THAN FOUR HOURS FROM ANGOLA AND THE WEST AFRICAN COASTLINE CAN RECOGNIZE THE MPLA REGIME, REFLECTING NO GREAT CONCERN OVER A SOVIET THREAT, SURELY THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN SECURITY INTERESTS IN THAT AREA IS VASTLY OVERRATED.

AMERICAN ANGOLA POLICY IS PARTICULARLY TROUBLESOME TO BLACK AMERICANS.

-- AS AN AMERICAN I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE U.S. SUPPORTING A REACTIONARY FACTION IN WHAT COULD BE A PROTRACTED WAR,
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BUT AS A BLACK AMERICAN I FIND IT UNACCEPTABLE FOR THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION TO SHED AFRICAN BLOOD IN THEIR WAR BY PROXY, AND THAT TWO SUPER POWERS SHOULD ARM AFRICANS TO KILL OTHER AFRICANS.

-- AS AN AMERICAN I OPPOSE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR A WAR IN WHICH IT HAS NO VITAL INTERESTS, YET AS A BLACK AMERICAN I REGRET THAT THE U.S. HAS NOT LIVED

UP TO ITS NOBLE TRADITION AS THE FIRST NEW NATION TO
WIN A WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, THAT HAS CONTINUALLY ESPOUSED
SELF DETERMINATION FOR ALL PEOPLE, BUT HAS ALLOWED
THE SOVIET UNION TO BECOME IDENTIFIED AS THE PRINCIPLE
SUPPORTER OF AFRICAN LIBERATION.

-- AS AN AMERICAN I WOULD DEPLORE SOVIET INTERVENTION,
BUT AS A BLACK AMERICAN I UNALTERABLY CONDEMN THE SOUTH
AFRICAN INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA AS
A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT THREATENING THE TERRITORIAL
SOVERIGNTY OF ALL AFRICAN NATIONS IN THE AREA.

THE OUTCOME OF THE OAU SUMMIT WILL HAVE PROFOUND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AFRICAN CONTINENT AND INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND STABIWITY. I AM CONFIDENT THAT AFRICAN WISDOM
AND SOLIDARITY WILL ENABLE THE CHIEFS OF STATE AND
GOVERNMENTS TO REACH AN APPROPRIATE SOLUTION WHICH
WILL CALL FOR:

1. A WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICA AND OTHER INTER-
VENING EXTERNAL POWERS
2. A CEASEFIRE
3. A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AMONG DISSIDENT FACTIONS

FINALLY I WANT TO REAFFIRMMY SUPPORT FOR THE CESSION
OF FURTHER U.S. MILITARY AND RELATED ASSISTANCE TO
PARTIES IN ANGOLA AND THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS 9
POINT PROGRAM FOR A NEW AMERICAN ANGOLAN POLICY ANNOUNCED
DECEMBER 17, 1975.

UPON MY RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES, I WILL RECOMMEND
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THAT THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS CONVENE A SUMMIT
OF BLACK AMERICAN LEADERS TO REVIEW THE ADMINISTRATION'S
AFRICAN POLICY AND TO FORM THE NUCLEUS OF A LOBBY OF
BLACKS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS IN AMERICA FOR A MORE PROGRESSIVE
AFRICAN POLICY. AS WE MOVE INTO THIS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEAR,
AFRICA WILL BECOME A FACTOR IN U.S. DOMESTIC POLITICS.

FINALLY IN AN EFFORT TO CONSOLIDATE ITS INTEREST IN THE
BLACK WORLD, I WANT TO ANNOUNCE THAT THE CONGRESSIONAL
BLACK CAUCUS WILL MEET WITH TOP CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS DURING THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE YEAR TO
EXAMINE FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. U.S.
AFRICAN POLICY WILL BE HIGH IN THE AGENDA.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, I A M PREPARED TO RESPOND TO

YOUR QUESTIONS.

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FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7672

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 3 ADDIS ABABA 0334

A REPORT FROM THE OAU MEETING ON ANGOLA, ADDIS ABABA

BY

THE HONORABLE CHARLES C. DIGGS., JANUARY 11, 1976

BEGIN TEXT

IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY MINISTRIAL COUNCIL'S FIRST EXTRAORDINARY SESSION IN THE ORGANIZATION'S HISTORY ON JANUARY 8 IN ADDIS ABABA, BRIGADIER GENERAL TEFERI BANTE, CHAIRMAN OF THE ETHIOPIAN PROVISIONAL MILITARY COUNCIL (PMAC) SAID THAT, "THE STRUGGLE FOR ANGOLA IS FOR THE BODY AND SOUL OF AFRICA."

NOT SINCE THE CONGO CRISES OF 1960 AND 1964 HAVE AFRICAN STATES FACED A SITUATION THAT SO GRAVELY AFFECTS THE AFRICAN CONTINENT. THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN ANGOLA BETWEEN THE RIVAL FACTIONS OF THE MPLA AND FNLA/UNITA IS COMPLICATED BY THE INTERVENTION OF SOUTH AFRICA AND EXTRA-CONTINENTAL POWERS, AND THE DIVERGENT PERCEP-

TIONS OF NATIONAL INTERESTS OF KEY AFRICAN STATES.

THE OAU HAS A THREEFOLD TASK: (1) TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICA AND OTHER INTERVENING POWERS; (2) TO OBTAIN A CEASEFIRE; AND (3) TO BRING ABOUT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AMONG THE WARRING ANGOLA FACTIONS THAT WILL END THE CONFLICT.

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DURING THE PAST FOUR DAYS, I HAVE HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH AMERICAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS, AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS AND AFRICAN REPRESENTATIVES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. BELOW IS A DISTILLATION OF THESE CONVERSATIONS COMBINED WITH MY OWN OBSERVATIONS.

AS A SIGNAL THAT THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN THEIR NORMAL DEBATES AND FORMULATION OF RESOLUTIONS IN PREPARATION FOR THE SUMMIT MEETING, BRIG. GEN. TEFERI BANTE CAUTIONED THE MINISTERS THAT THEY WERE NOT EXPECTED TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSIONS OR ARRIVE AT DECISIONS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS ON THEIR OWN. THEREFORE AFTER ADOPTING THE AGENDA FOR THE SUMMIT MEETING, "THE CONSIDERATION OF THE ANGOLAN PROBLEMS," THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ADJOURNED THEREBY TABLING CONSIDERATION OF AN MPLA REQUEST FOR ACCEPTANCE OF ITS CREDENTIALS AS A PARTICIPATING MEMBER STATE.

ON THE OPENING DAY OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS' MEETING, THERE WAS THE FOLLOWING AFRICAN POLITICAL LINEUP:

GOVERNMENTS RECONGIZING MPLA - 20
14 STRONG SUPPORTERS

ALGERIA	LIBYA
BENIN	MALAGASY REPUBLIC
CAPE VERDE	MALI
CONGO	MOZAMBIQUE
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	NIGERIA
GUINEA	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
GUINEA BISSAU	SOMALIA

6 MORE WILLING TO COMPROMISE

BURUNDI	MAURITIUS
CHAD	SUDAN
GHANA	TANZANIA

GOVERNMENTS LEANING TOWARDS MPLA - 3

ETHIOPIA
GAMBIA
MAURITANIA

GOVERNMENTS STRONGLY SUPPORTING FNLA/UNITA - 7
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC SENEGAL
GABON ZAIRE
IVORY COAST ZAMBIA
LESOTHO

NEUTRAL GOVERNMENTS - 12
4 WARY OF MPLA AND SOVIET INTENTIONS
EGYPT LIBERIA
KENYA MOROCCO

8 UNDECIDED
BOTSWANA SIERRA LEONE
COMOROS TOGO
NIGER UGANDA
RWANDA UPPER VOLTA

THE SUMMIT OF THE CHIEFS OF STATES WILL HAVE TO TAKE A POSITION ON
FOUR PRINCIPAL DIVISIVE ISSUES:

1. THE CREDENTIALS QUESTION ON WHETHER TO SEAT THE MPLA OR THE FNLA/
UNITA FACTION AS A PARTICIPATING MEMBER GOVERNMENT.

THE MPLA SUPPORTERS ADVOCATE THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE MPLA CREDENTIALS
ON THE GROUNDS THAT MEMBERSHIP IN THE OAU IS VIRTUALLY AUTOMATIC
FOR AN AFRICAN INDEPENDENT STATE. IN CONTRAST, FNLA/UNITA ADHERENTS
AND OTHERS ARGUE THAT THE OAU ALREADY HAS RECOGNIZED ALL THREE
GROUPS, THEREFORE NO ADDITIONAL ACTION IS REQUIRED. DESPITE THE
PLURALITY OF MPLA SUPPORTERS AMONG THE MEMBER STATES, A GROWING
NUMBER APPEAR TO PREFER A RECONCILIATION OF THE PRINCIPAL CON-
TENDING FORCES.

2. CESSATION OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION

THE MPLA SUPPORTERS LEAN TOWARDS A STRONG CONDEMNATION OF SOUTH
AFRICAN INTERVENTION AND CALL FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL ALONG WITH THAT
OF ALL OTHER "IMPERIALIST" INVOLVEMENT, PERHAPS CITING THE UNITED
STATES BY NAME. NEUTRALISTS AND FNLA/UNITA PROBABLY WILL CALL FOR
THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN AND OTHER EXTERNAL POWERS, PERHAPS
CITING THE SOVIET UNION BY NAME.

THE COMPROMISE POSITION IS LIKELY TO CALL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF
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SOUTH AFRICA FIRST, AND THEN UNNAMED "OTHER" FOREIGN STATES.

3. CEASEFIRE AND RECONCILIATION

THE COMPOSITION OF A FUTURE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT CLEARLY REMAINS THE MOST DIVISIVE ISSUE. POLARIZATION REVOLVES AROUND TWO MAIN POSITIONS. DR. NETO'S SUPPORTERS URGE THE RECOGNITION OF MPLA WHILE OTHERS SEEK THE CREATION OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

THE COMPROMISE POSITION WILL UNDOUBTEDLY INVOLVE SUPPORT FOR THE MPLA WITH THE STIPULATION THAT THERE BE RECONCILIATION AMONG THE THREE FACTIONS IN A PROVISIONAL REGIME TO BE FOLLOWED BY AN OAU SUPERVISED ELECTION, OR SOME OTHER METHOD OF SELECTING A PERMANENT GOVERNMENT.

MOST ADMIT THAT THE MPLA DOES NOT CONTROL ENOUGH OF ANGOLA TO PRE-SIDE OVER THE ENTIRE TERRITORY. NEVERTHELESS HARDLINE MPLA SUPPORTERS WILL BE RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT ANY ACCOMMODATION WITH ELEMENTS WHO HAVE BENEFITTED FROM DIRECT OR INDIRECT SOUTH AFRICAN ASSISTANCE. MORE CONCILIATORY PRAGMATIC STATES SEEM WILLING TO ACCEPT A REDEMPTIONIST CONVERSION.

IT APPEARS THAT SUPPORT FOR HOLDEN ROBERTO'S FNLA IS ERODING. NOT ONLY HAS ROBERTO BEEN HURT BY REVELATIONS THAT HE HAS BEEN AIDED COVERTLY BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, BUT ALSO RECENT MILITARY REVERSALS HAVE WEAKENED HIS POSITION. ASIDE FROM ZAIRE, WHICH STRONGLY BACKS FNLA, MOST OPPONENTS OF MPLA SUPPORT UNITA. THEREFORE IT IS NOT UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT AN MPLA/UNITA DOMINATED COALITION EMERGING FROM THE OAU DELIBERATIONS.

EVEN AN MPLA/UNITA COALITION WOULD CONSTITUTE AN UNEASY ALLIANCE. DR. JONAS SAVIMBI, UNITA'S LEADER WOULD HAVE TO PURGE HIMSELF OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN STIGMA AND DR. AUGUSTINO NETO, HEAD OF MPLA WOULD BE CONSTRAINED TO TRANSFORM ITS BELLIGERENT POLICY TOWARDS ZAIRE TO ONE OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE.

4. ENFORCEMENT ACTION

THE ONLY FACTOR THAT COULD MAKE ANY RECOMMENDATION COMING OUT OF THIS OAU SUMMIT ANY DIFFERENT FROM CALLS FOR RECONCILIATION AT THE 1975 KAMPALA MEETING, WOULD BE THE CREATION OF SOME ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM. UNCLASSIFIED

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ANY OAU PEACEKEEPING FORCE WOULD HAVE TO BE BALANCED POLITICALLY. WHILE THE LOGISTICS AND THE POLITICAL ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED ARE COMPLEX, SUCH A FORCE SEEMS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT A CEASEFIRE AND THE DISENGAGEMENT OF EXTERNAL POWERS.

THE AFOREMENTIONED SUMMARY OF CONVERSATIONS REINFORCE MY BELIEF IN THE FALLACY OF US POLICY IN AFRICA.

ANY GOVERNMENT SENSITIVE TO THE EXTREME HOSTILITY AGAINST RACIST,
MINORITY-RULED SOUTH AFRICA ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT NEVER SHOULD
HAVE ALLOWED ITSELF TO BE ON THE SAME SIDE AS THE VORSTER REGIME
UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES.

THAT PRESIDENT FORD SHOULD ADDRESS A WRITTEN COMMUNICATION TO AFRICAN
HEADS OF STATE REQUESTING SOVIET AND CUBAN WITHDRAWAL AS THE QUID
PRO QUO FOR SOUTH AFRICAN DISENGAGEMENT REFLECTS ARROGANCE,
IGNORANCE, OR BOTH. YOU SIMPLY CANNOT EQUATE SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT
WITH SOUTH AFRICAN AGGRESSION. THE SOVIET UNION HAS SUPPORTED
VIRTUALLY EVERY AFRICAN LIBERATION GROUP FORCED TO RESORT TO VIOLENCE
WHEN ALL NEGOTIATION FOR INDEPENDENCE FAILED. (HOWEVER, IT IS
TRUE THAT AT NO POINT DURING THE STRUGGLE AGAINST PORTUGAL DID
THE KREMLIN PROVIDE THE LETHAL WEAPONS NOW AVAILABLE IN ANGOLA.)

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A REPORT FROM THE OAU MEETING ON ANGOLA, ADDIS ABABA

BY

THE HONORABLE CHARLES C. DIGGS., JANUARY 11, 1976

IN CONTRAST, SOUTH AFRICA REMAINS THE BASTION OF WHITE SUPREMACIST
DOMINATION ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT. TO LINK THE TWO IS TO CONFUSE
THE ALLY OF AFRICAN LIBERATION STRUGGLES WITH THE RACIST ARCH VILLAIN.

TALK ABOUT DETENTE ON ONE HAND AND INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA TO CON-

TAIN A SOVIET CHALLENGE ON THE OTHER, MANY ARGUE, REFLECTS A CONTRADICTION IN U.S. POLICY, SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER'S EXPLANATION OF A TWO-PRONGED SOVIET POLICY NOT WITHSTANDING.

IF BRAZIL, WHOSE PRINCIPAL CITY IS LESS THAN FOUR HOURS BY JET FROM LUANDA AND WHO IS NOT RENOWNED FOR ITS RADICAL POLITICS, HAS RECOGNIZED THE MPLA GOVERNMENT AND SHOWS NO CONCERN OVER A POSSIBLE COMMUNIST THREAT, IT IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE U.S. PERCEIVES A POTENTIAL CHALLENGE TO ITS SECURITY.

STATEMENTS BY U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS MOYNIHAN AND OTHER STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS CITED IN THE PRESS SUGGEST THAT AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA IS IN FACT AN EFFORT TO PREVENT SOUTH AFRICAN ENCIRCLEMENT BY "RADICAL" STATES. IF THE UNCLASSIFIED
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U.S. PERSISTS IN KEEPING ITS FINGER IN THE DIKE TO HOLD BACK THIS LATEST WAVE OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM, PARTICULARLY SINCE ITS TILT TOWARD PORTUGUESE COLONIALISTS AND SOUTH AFRICAN RACISTS, IT WILL FIND ITS OWN CREDIBILITY SWEEPED AWAY IN THE PROCESS.

THE REAL TRAGEDY IS THAT THE DISASTROUS POLICY COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. PROPER APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM WERE RECOMMENDED BY CERTAIN AMERICAN EMBASSIES IN AFRICA AND FROM WITHIN THE AFRICAN BUREAU OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT, BUT THEY WERE IGNORED. ONCE AGAIN THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS EXHIBITED A PECULIAR MISUNDERSTANDING OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN REALITIES. HE HAS CIRCUMVENTED DEPARTMENT SPECIALISTS AND FIELD OFFICERS WHO FOLLOW EVENTS ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS, TO PURSUE A POLICY BASED UPON OUTDATED EUROCENTRIC PERCEPTIONS AND EAST-WEST CONFRONTATIONAL DIPLOMACY.

AMERICAN POLICY IN ANGOLA, WHICH IS THE CULMINATION OF A SERIES OF BLUNDERS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, REAFFIRMS THAT U.S. POLICY MAKERS SUFFER FROM A PROFOUND PERCEPTUAL LAG AND AN APPARENT INABILITY TO ADJUST FULLY TO THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALITIES OF THE SEVENTIES. ALL OF WHICH SUGGESTS THAT THERE MUST BE A GREATER RESPECT FOR A RELIANCE UPON RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS FROM THE FIELD AND THE AFRICAN BUREAU.

THE ADMINISTRATION MUST ACCELERATE THE PROCESS TOWARDS A TOTAL REASSESSMENT OF ITS AFRICAN POLICY.

THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION PROPOSED BY DR. KISSINGER DURING THE SEVENTH UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSION WAS A POSITIVE STEP IN CREATING NEW RELATIONS WITH THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. NOW IS THE TIME TO MOVE BEYOND PRO- NOUNCEMENTS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROGRAM. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO EXPAND ITS AID PROGRAM IN AFRICA AND BUILD UPON THE GOODWILL ESTABLISHED BY ITS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO AFRICAN DROUGHT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SHOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS ON AN INTERNATIONAL FOOD

RESERVE SYSTEM AND TO SOLICIT CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO MATCH AND EXCEED ITS OWN \$200 MILLION COMMITMENT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT (IFAD). IT SHOULD SOFTEN ITS RESISTANCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COCOA AGREEMENT AND TO OTHER PROPOSED COMMODITY ARRANGEMENTS. THIS IS THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE WAY TO MEET THE COMPETITIVE FORCES OF THE USSR AND

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OTHER NATIONS WHO HAVE INTERESTS IN AFRICA.

U.S. INTERMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM INTERESTS REQUIRE THE END OF AD HOC RE-

ACTIVE POLICY-MAKING WHICH BOTH IGNORES THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF EVENTS IN AFRICA AND THE INCREASING DEPENDENCE UPON RESOURCES FOUND IN AFRICA NECESSARY FOR AMERICA'S INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION, AND REJECTS THE INEVITABILITY OF AFRICAN MAJORITY RULE FROM CAIRO TO CAPETOWN.

I STRONGLY REAFFIRM MY SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. SENATE ACTION TAKEN DECEMBER 19, 1975, TO BLOCK ALL FURTHER MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ANGOLA AND I URGE MY COLLEAGUES IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO CONCUR WHEN THIS ISSUE IS DEBATED AFTER CONGRESS RECONVENES JANUARY 19.

MOST IMPORTANTLY, MY VISIT TO ADDIS HAS REINFORCED THE VALIDITY OF THE

17 MEMBER CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS' 9-POINT PROGRAM FOR A NEW AMERICAN POLICY IN ANGOLA ANNOUNCED DECEMBER 17, 1975.

APART FROM SOME REVISIONS AND REORDERING OF THE STEPS, WE AGAIN CALL UPON THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

1. MAKE A PUBLIC DECLARATION SPECIFICALLY CALLING UPON SOUTH AFRICA TO WITHDRAW AND INDICATING TO THE PRETORIA GOVERNMENT, AS WE HAVE TO THE SOVIET UNION, THAT ITS INTERVENTION IS A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE, AND RECALLING THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH AFRICA UNTIL SUCH DISENGAGEMENT IS ACCOMPLISHED:

2. URGE A CEASEFIRE AMONG ALL PARTIES, AFTER SOUTH AFRICA IS OUT;

3. CEASE IMMEDIATELY ALL MILITARY RELATED ASSISTANCE, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, TO ANY PARTIES FIGHTING IN ANGOLA, AND WITHDRAW ITS REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL MILITARY AND RELATED ASSISTANCE;

4. USE ITS GOOD OFFICE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT AMONG ALL NON-ANGOLAN, INCLUDING EUROPEAN POWERS, INVOLVED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, THAT THEY WILL END THEIR INTERVENTION;

5. URGE THE ANGOLAN FACTINS IT HAS SUPPORTED TO FIND AN IMMEDIATE POLITICAL SOLUTION;

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6. STRESS TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT AMERICAN PUBLIC REACTION TO ITS INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA IS BOUND TO AFFECT SUPPORT FOR ITS FUTURE ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

7. URGE ALL COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT THE RESULTS OF THE OAU MEETINGS

FOR GUIDELINES WITH RESPECT TO ANGOLA;

8. COMMIT THE U.S. TO SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC AND REHABILITATION ASSISTANCE TO WHATEVER ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT, PROVISIONAL AND PERMANENT, IS RECOGNIZED BY THE OAU; AND

9. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE RECOMMENDATIONS AND KEEP ALL INTERESTED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ADVISED ON FURTHER U.S. POLICY AND INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA.

ON MY RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES, I PLAN TO CONVENE A SUMMIT OF BLACK AMERICAN LEADERS TO REVIEW THE ADMINISTRATION'S AFRICAN POLICY AND TO FORM THE NUCLEUS OF A BLACK LOBBY IN AMERICA FOR AFRICA. AS WE MOVE INTO THIS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEAR, AFRICA MUST BECOME A FACTOR IN U.S. DOMESTIC POLITICS.

MOREOVER, IN AN EFFORT TO CONSOLIDATE ITS INTEREST IN THE BLACK WORLD, THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS WILL MEET WITH CARIBBEAN TOP GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS DURING THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE YEAR TO EXAMINE FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

THE OAU SUMMIT AND ITS AFTERMATH WILL HAVE PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AFRICAN CONTINENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND PROSPERITY. ANOTHER POINT BRIGADIER GENERAL TEFERI BANTE MADE IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT TO THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL IS ALSO INSTRUCTIVE:

...ITS (OAU'S OUTCOME WILL DECIDE WHICH WAY AFRICA WILL GO -- WHETHER AFRICANS WILL BE MASTERS OF THEIR OWN DESTINY, OR WHETHER THEY, AS SOME WOULD LIKE THEM TO BEHAVE, WILL ONLY DANCE TO THE TUNES SET BY OTHERS.

I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE LEADERS OF AFRICA WILL FIND AN APPROPRIATE SOLUTION TO THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT. THE REAL DANGER IS THAT THE U.S. MAY NOT HAVE THE WISDOM TO FOLLOW ITS RECOMMENDATIONS. END TEXT.

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Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
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Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
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Status: NATIVE
Subject: CODEL DIGGS: CONGR. DIGGS JAN 11 PRESS STATEMENTS THERE FOLLOWS VERBATIM TEXT OF STATEMENTS RELEASED BY CONG.
TAGS: PFOR, AO, US, OAU, (DIGGS, CHARLES C JR)
To: STATE
Type: TE
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